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Abstract:
In order to process Space Shuttle
vehicles for launch, the various Shuttle
systems are subjected to various test
and checkout procedures prior to launch.
The system of interest in this paper is
the Shuttle Data Processing System (DPS)
and, in particular, the DPS Multi-
Function CRT Display System (MCDS) . Due
to the complexity of the Shuttle as a
whole and DPS in particular, the system
may at times behave in an unpredictable
yet benign manner in respect to normal
operations. Therefore, it is difficult
for even experienced systems engineers
to determine whether an annunciated er-
ror is truly a failure or a benign
anomaly. An automated, prototype diag-
nostic tool is to be described in order
to provide a solution to the labor in-
tensive and time consuming diagnostic
techniques currently used. The MCDS
Diagnostic Tool (MDT) will be capable of
monitoring the MCDS system real time,
recognizing and analyzing failures
giving the user a probable cause of the
failure. The MDT is considered to be a
pioneering diagnostic system for all DPS
subsystems diagnostics.
The primary goal at the Kennedy Space
Center is to prepare the space Shuttle
system, both the Shuttle and its
payload, for launch into low earth or-
bit. In order for this goal to be ac-
complished in an efficient yet safe man-
ner, all Shuttle sub-systems are sub-
jected to various test and checkout pro-
cedures prior to launch. A majority of
these procedures are carried out by sys-
tems engineers (via ground software)
from firing room resident computer con-
soles. This network of computer con-
soles which constitutes a main component
of the ground Launch Processing System
(LPS), is connected to the Shuttle via a
Launch Data Bus (LDB) . In this manner,
systems engineers are able to monitor
and control vehicle subsystems whether
the Shuttle is residing in the orbiter
processing facility, vehicle assembly
building or pads.
The Shuttle system of interest in this
paper is the Shuttle's Data Processing
System (DPS) . The DPS is composed of
(I) General Purpose Computers (GPC) (2)
Multi-Function CRT Display System (MCDS)
(3) Mass Memory Units (MMU), and (4)
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM) and re-
lated software. As is currently done,
checkout and configuration of DPS sub-
systems are done by a DPS systems en-
gineer initiating and controlling a set
of ground software programs. Additional
system configurations are done by manual
switch settings inside the cockpit via
voice instruction to a space craft
operator.
In order to ensure the correct function-
ing of Shuttle systems, some level of
automatic error detection has been in-
corporated into all Shuttle systems.
For the DPS system, error detection
equipment has been incorporated into all
its subsystems. This error detection
equipment is typically manifested as
electronic circuitry composed of
hardware registers where the bits of a
particular register corresponds to par-
ticular errors (i.e. power transient
detected). Additional errors are annun-
ciated using both visual cues (i.e.
mechanical flags and lights) and
auditory cues (i.e. alarms and tones).
This error detection equipment provides
the system engineer with a real time
awareness that a failure has occurred
and allows him or her to properly safe
the system in a timely manner. While
this error detecting equipment makes the
engineer aware of a subsystem failure,
it does not (in most cases) give a cause
of the failure. Due to the complexity
of the Shuttle, both in terms of
hardware and software, errors will fre-
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quent±y arlse during normal operations
which are of an anomalous but harmless
nature, but again due to system com-
plexity, it is up to the systems en-
gineer level of experience to differen-
tiate the harmful from the benign er-
rors. Frequently, an inexperienced (and
even an experienced engineer) will en-
counter a fundamentally benign failure
yet diagnose it as a harmful one. In
the interim, much paperwork is generated
and a possible temporary interruption in
launch processing may be experienced.
It is at this point that a brief
description of the current diagnostic
methods should be discussed. As was
stated earlier, the error detection
equipment alerts the responsible system
engineer that an anomaly has occurred,
but not what has caused it. In order to
ascertain the cause of an anomaly, the
responsible system engineer(s) must ap-
prehend what the overall system environ-
ment was when the error occurred, and in
order to do this, the engineer must rely
on telemetry data. This telemetry data
takes on two forms for DPS subsystems.
The first is what is called dump data.
Two of the DPS subsystems, the GPC's and
the MCDS have resident stored memory
capacity (GPC of 104K and the MCDS of
8K) . When an error occurs in either one
of these two subsystems, the mal-
functioning component is isolated and
the stored memory is then transmitted
down the LDB and placed on magnetic tape
and paper printout. This memory content
of the anomalous subsystem provides the
engineer with an image or state of
operation of the subsystem during the
time at which the error occurred. This
information is then combined with the
second type of telemetry which is called
downlist data. Downlist data is simply
the encoded values, states and times of
a large number of discrete and analog
Shuttle parameters. It is from this raw
data which the engineer(s) must review
manually, that a diagnosis of the
problem is obtained (hopefully). Again,
due to the complexity of the Shuttle,
the amount of raw data is large (the
MCDS alone has 8K of memory locations
which must be reviewed manually) and,
hence, is labor intensive and time con-
suming.
As stated in the abstract, we are
describing an automated diagnostic sys-
tem, the Multifunction CRT Display Sys-
tem Diagnostic Tool (MDT), which will
aid in a more efficient processing of
the DPS. Before going on to describe in
more detail the functioning of the MDT,
a brief description of the MCDS will be
given. The MCDS is composed of three
basic systems: (I) Keyboard, (2) Dis-
play Electronic Unit (DEU), (3) CRT.
The neart or the MCDS is the DEU which
is the information processor for data
between the CRT, keyboard and GPC's and
allows the astronauts to communicate to
the GPC's and vice versa. The DEU is
composed of various logical circuitry
for CRT data display, keyboard data and
processing of GPC commands and data. In
addition, the DEU has a memory store of
8K in which to store data and commands
for MCDS information processing, as well
as, built-in test equipment (BITE) cir-
cuitry. This BITE circuitry is composed
of three 16 bit status registers and two
mechanical flags.
Now that a brief overview of the Shuttle
processing and diagnostic environment
has been described, a number of short-
comings have been mentioned in reqard to
the current nature of orbiter related
diagnostics. These will now be stated
more compactly:
(i) As it stands now, current
diagnostic techniques used to arrive at
problem resolutions are labor intensive
and time consuming.
(2) Due to the complexity of the
system (Shuttle, as a whole, and the
DPS, in particular) being processed, the
behavior of the system can, at times,
behave in an unpredictable but benign
manner with respect to normal opera-
tions. This makes it difficult for the
systems engineers to know whether an an-
nunciated error is truly serious or
trivial.
Point 2 will have to be expanded upon,
in order to make what follows in the
rest of this paper consistent. The
Shuttle has been in operation for almost
ii years, hence, there is also a commen-
surate ii years worth of documented
Shuttle behavior. The Shuttle behavior
of most interest here is of the
anomalous DPS kind, and this type of be-
havior has been, in most cases,
thoroughly documented. This documenta-
tion will be described metaphorically as
a triadic problem resolving knowledge
base. The first part of this triad is
known as a Problem Report (PR) database.
This PR database is a paper system which
is used to track the history and resolu-
tion (if one exists) of launch process-
ing related anomalies. The second part
of the triad is a "user's note"
resource. The user note resource docu-
ments and explains DPS subsystem be-
havior which is anomalous but also
benign with respect to the running of
normal operations. The last and most
important leg of this triad is the
cerebral documentation which resides in
the minds of our most experienced and
astute engineers. It is from the inter-
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action of this problem resolving
knowledge base that solutions to our
problems are derived.
The inherent drawbacks of this system
are as stated in (i) above, and also in
that our triadic system must rely on a
component (i.e. that astute systems en-
gineer) who may not be accessible for
some reason or another when a problem
arises. These two weaknesses in the
system, by their very nature, allow
themselves to be alleviated to some ex-
tent by automation. By incorporating a
high-speed automated system, which has
residing within it, both the paper his-
tory of problems and the diagnostic wis-
dom of our engineers (as best as that
can be done), an integrative tool can be
added to our diagnostic triad to help
support the system as a whole. For our
particular purposes (DPS), the MDT is a
way of realizing an automated diagnostic
system which can aid us in doing busi-
ness with misbehaving avionics boxes.
This system is to fulfill the following
four goals:
(i) Monitoring of downlist data
for MCDS anomalies
(2) Testing the downlist data for
the presence of pre-defined error condi-
tions
(3) Presentation to the user of
probable cause of the failure
(4) Presentation of problem report
and user note information corresponding
to the failure detected.
How the MDT proposes to attain these
four goals is the topic of our next sec-
tion.
The MDT is contracted to Rockwell Inter-
national Corporation, Launch Support
Services. The development team consists
of Rockwell test personnel from the
Avionics Software organization at KSC,
Florida, and Artificial Intelligence
personnel from the Expert Systems Ap-
plications organization at Downey,
California. In addition, Abacus
Programming Corporation personnel were
added to augment the team.
The host computing system will be a SUN
SPARCstation 1 Plus. This system was
selected for its ability to perform
multi-tasking with its UNIX based
operating system. In addition, the SUN
SPARCstation was selected to maintain
compatibility between this advisory sys-
tem and future firing room applications.
The "C" Language Integrated Production
System (CLIPS) was selected as the ex-
pert system shell to be utilized by the
MDT. CLIPS is a forward chaining rule-
based language that provides an in-
ference engine and a language syntax
that lends itself to interfacing with
externally defined functions. As more
and more firing room applications are
automated, it is believed that a stan-
dard shell with increased capabilities
will be available with the cost being
shared among projects.
The conceptual system (Figure i) will be
powered on in the firing room at all
times when the orbiter is powered on.
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The system will be in a "standby" mode
of operation awaiting occurrence of
off-nominal conditions. While in
"standby" mode, test engineering person-
nel may pictorially view the current
configuration and status of the MCDS
system as it is on-board the orbiter.
The MDT will dynamically update the Sys-
tem State Model display and monitor for
errors with near real time data from a
telemetry link to the firing room Common
Data Buffer (CDBFR) .
The process of acquiring the telemetry
data (Figure 2) is a most challenging
process, since the present firing room
hardware is not compatible with the SUN.
A method of acquiring telemetry data has
been developed by the Advisory System
Data Acquisition Project at KSC [3] .
This telemetry data will be read from
the Launch Processing System (LPS) com-
mon data buffer via a data control
program. This program scans the buffer
once a second and sends the data to a
VME subsystem that blocks the incoming
data stream into Ethernet frames and
sends it out on an Ethernet line to
various system users. The MDT com-
munications process accepts the incoming
data and places it in a data buffer
residing on the SUN. This buffer is in
shared memory and is accessible to the
various applications resident on the
SUN.
The incoming data will be monitored for
off-nominal conditions. More ex-
plicitly, the three status registers for
each of the four DEU's will be monitored
for any abnormal bit pattern change.
The monitoring of these 12 parameters
can detect up to 90% of all MCDS
failures. If an MCDS failure that is
not triggered by status register changes
occurs, the engineer will be able to
utilize a manual mode of operations in
which an analysis can be performed
without being initiated by changes in
telemetry data.
Once an anomalous condition is recog-
nized, a "snapshot" of the MCDS environ-
ment is taken and saved for the system
to begin the error analysis process.
This snapshot process allows the system
to complete the analysis process of
single error without possible loss of a
secondary error. Once an error is
detected, a set of pre-defined error
conditions are checked. Each error con-
dition requires the analysis of a unique
set of data from the buffer and possibly
the user. The user will be queried in
situations where telemetry data is
either unavailable or insufficient. In
general, user requests will be data that
may only be obtained by visual inspec-
tion of the MCDS (i.e. blank CRT's or
tripped mechanical flags). The need for
user supplied data will be kept to a
minimum to enhance the automated nature
of the system.
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The system will evaluate and eliminate
possible causes of the given failure
condition. A hierarchy will exist among
the pre-defined error conditions such
that if an error condition of high prob-
ability is determined to be the cause,
other unlikely conditions will not be
checked. The possibility does exist for
more than one probable cause of a
failure to be displayed to the user.
This could occur if telemetry data is
temporarily unavailable or if the user
did not supply the necessary data. As
always, the systems engineer makes the
ultimate decision concerning the most
probable cause of the failure using data
obtained from the MDT. The data used in
the error analysis process will be saved
to a file for later use in the re-
creation of failure scenarios for either
re-evaluation or training. The data
necessary to perform the analysis
process is being provided by Rockwell
and NASA KSC employees. For each of the
possible failure conditions currently
recognized, a thorough review of his-
torical data, both documented and un-
documented, must be performed. This
data is then organized into "rules" that
will be encoded into the system by Rock-
well, Downey.
All results of the error analysis will
be displayed to the CRT and output to a
printer. The results are the coordina-
tion of the system environment at the
time of the error, probable causes of
the failure, possible troubleshooting
steps to be taken, and references to
past problems and user notes pertaining
to the failure condition. The coordina-
tion of this information is currently
done manually by the systems engineers
and is a time consuming process. All
the information obtained from the
results will be utilized to support
closure of paperwork generated at KSC
due to the MCDS failure.
The mode of operations described thus
far constitutes the "Automatic" mode of
operation. This mode will have the
highest priority and will automatically
be run as a foreground task upon receipt
of an anomalous condition. This system
also includes "Manual" and "Replay"
modes that are available on an as-needed
basis. The selection of either mode
presents the user with sub menu's to ac-
cess the MDT functions. The user will
have the ability to perform "what-if"
analysis on the MCDS in a test environ-
ment, replay already analyzed failures,
review past PR and user note databases,
and review the results of past failure
analysis.
The MDT is viewed by the systems en-
gineers at KSC as a highly desirable
concept. By automating the processes
performed manually at this time, MCDS
failure recognition and resolution can
be performed more rapidly and effi-
ciently. This system will also provide
invaluable training experience for sys-
tems engineers. The MDT system require-
ments and specifications, as defined,
are such that the previously mentioned
diagnostic triad representing an
automated problem resolving knowledge
base can be utilized.
The MDT is a 3 year project in which
the first year prototype will con-
centrate on the development of a proof-
of-concept prototype to demonstrate the
four goals defined. The prototype will
encompass the utilization of telemetry
downlist data to perform diagnostics of
the MCDS. The prototype to be delivered
by October 1990 will perform automated
analysis of between 5 and i0 errors.
Its manual mode will provide the
capability to search the PR and user
note databases and to retrieve informa-
tion about DEU status register bits.
The second year will include the addi-
tion of the remaining known error
scenarios, as well as, the addition of
simulated DEU dump data. The dump data
will enhance the diagnostic capabilities
of the MDT. The final year will consist
of integration with the Expert System
for Operations Distributed Users System
(EXODUS) [2] and the capture of near
real time DEU dump data. This should
complete the firing room implementation
of the MDT.
The developers of the MDT view this con-
cept as a pioneering diagnostic system
for all DPS subsystems (GPC, MDM, MMU).
A long term goal of the MDT project is
that an eventual integration of all DPS
diagnostics will be realized in a dis-
tributed diagnostic system. Such a dis-
tributed knowledge base concept for
launch processing is already being in-
vestigated at KSC under the EXODUS
program. It is hoped that the knowledge
gained with the MDT and other Shuttle
advisory systems currently being
developed [i] will aid the EXODUS
program and, in turn, help in the
realization of a distributed DPS diag-
nostic system.
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APPENDIX
Acronyms
BITE - Built In Test Equipment
CDBFR - Common Data Buffer
CLIPS - "C" Language Integrated Produc-
tion System
CRT - Cathode Ray Tube
DEU - Display Electronics Unit
DPS - Data Processing System
EXODUS - Expert System for Operations
Distributed Users System
GPC - General Purpose Computer
LDB - Launch Data Bus
LPS - Launch Processing System
MCDS - Multi-Function CRT Display System
MDM - Multiplexer Demultiplexer
MDT - MCDS Diagnostic Tool
MMU - Mass Memory Unit
PR - Problem Report
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